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Abstract
We propose a model of climate change consistent with four principal stylized facts. First, the
beneﬁts and costs of climate change mitigation policies are not evenly distributed across genera-
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The introduction of policies designed to reduce global carbon emissions is likely to greatly
alter the returns to investment in research and development activities in the energy sector.
Despite this, much of the economics literature on climate change has relied on exogenous
time paths for technological change which are not related to policy choices. Recent papers
by Goulder and Schneider (1999), Nordhaus (2002), Buonanno et al. (2003), and Popp
(2004) have addressed the sensitivity of model results to the assumption that technological
change is independent of policy. Further, papers by Popp (2004b), Gerlagh (2003), Gerlagh
and van der Zwaan (2003), Gerlagh and Lise (2005), and Gerlagh (2006) have examined
how the economy is likely to evolve in response to climate policy when there is competition
between technologies.
Like the above-mentioned papers, we are interested in the economic transitions and tech-
nological change induced by climate policies. Through simulations of a calibrated economic
model, we seek to evaluate the eﬀects of proposed policies in terms of climate change mit-
igation, aggregate economic growth, changes in energy supply and technology, and cohort
welfare. The model we propose is innovative in its consistency with the four stylized facts
outlined below.
First, climate change policy and its ability to induce technological innovation represent
potentially signiﬁcant transfers of resources across generations. Agents alive today are
expected to bear most of the costs of climate policy while the beneﬁts in terms of climate
change mitigation, technological innovation, and more abundant resources are passed on
to future generations. Induced technological change not only aﬀects the costs of meeting
emissions targets, it may also alter the distribution of these costs across generations. In
order to capture this important dimension, we follow the approach developed in Leach
(2004) to characterize a decentralized economy comprised of overlapping generations of
ﬁnite-lived agents. We do not solve explicitly for optimal policy, but rather examine the
impact of climate policy on the welfare of cohorts of agents born both before and after
policies are imposed. This is an important dimension of policy evaluation thus far absent
from the literature on induced innovation.
Second, the supply of capital is not a pre-determined condition under which we can set
2environmental policy. Rather, domestic savings account for the majority of capital avail-
able for production and research and development, and this supply will be responsive to
changes in interest rates. In our general equilibrium model, climate change policies jointly
aﬀect the accumulation of physical, environmental, and knowledge capital through changes
in aggregate interest rates and sector-speciﬁc rates of return. In particular, a market is
developed for capital, where supply is determined by the savings decisions of ﬁnite-lived
agents as a function of rates of return, and capital is demanded both for production and
research and development activities. This diﬀerentiates our model from optimal policy
models in the tradition of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) in which investment and emissions
control policies are co-determined.
Third, although it may be ﬁnanced by governments, most research and development ac-
tivity in the energy sector is undertaken by private ﬁrms. In OECD member countries,
we observe that research and development accounts for 2.26% of GDP, of which 62% is
ﬁnanced by the private sector. In World Energy Council (WEC) (2001), an average of
48.4% of US energy sector research and development investment between 1974 and 1999
is found to be from the private sector. Our model explicitly characterizes ﬁrms that rent
investment capital in order to develop and sell energy technology in response to incentives
provided by government subsidies. In the model we propose, energy production technol-
ogy, the emissions intensities of output and energy production, and the share of alternative
energy in total energy supply are each endogenous consequences of private rates of return
and government policy.
Fourth, important imperfections exist in the market for research and development. Re-
search and development activities are aimed at speciﬁc sectors of the energy market. The
proceeds of these activities are, at best, weakly substitutable across energy sectors and
other sectors of the economy, leading to important pecuniary externalities across sectors.
We address this by explicitly modeling the competition between ﬁrms for research and de-
velopment capital. It is also often the case that protection for inventors is limited, leading
to dynamic ineﬃciencies. In our model, we capture this ineﬃciency since all inventions are
assumed to become public domain after one period. This represents an important lower
bound on the role of private incentives in driving research and development. Finally, the
role of technological improvements in terms of climate change mitigation is assumed ex-
ternal to both the technology ﬁrms and production ﬁrms in the model.
3We calibrate the model to match global data, and perform policy simulations. Among other
results, we show that gross world product (GWP), emissions reduction, and alternative
energy intensity may all be enhanced by a policy of carbon taxes recycled as alternative
energy subsidies rather than as lump-sum transfers to agents. However, we ﬁnd that
agents prefer the lump-sum transfers to the subsidy recycling, and that agents alive when
the policy is imposed prefer the status quo over any of the policies simulated. We ﬁnd
that research and development subsidies designed to reduce the carbon intensity of the
economy increase emissions levels in the long run, while subsidies augmenting investment
in alternative energy technology lead to increases in energy consumption but not emissions.
The decentralized nature of our model allows us to readily isolate the leverage of various
features of the model on our results. First, we examine the importance of capital market
structure. We ﬁnd that capital demand for research and development may be less price
elastic than the demand for physical capital. This is important for calibrating the costs of
capital displaced by new research and development investment. Second, we examine the
changes in results when investment is only possible in carbon-saving technology, as is the
case in Popp (2004a) and Nordhaus (2002). Finally, we evaluate the sensitivity of results
to assumptions on the functional form determining the ability of the economy to integrate
new sources of alternative energy in production.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and
the modiﬁcations for research and development. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the solution
algorithm and calibration of the model. Section 5 presents the policy simulations and
evaluation results. Section 6 discusses these results in the context of other papers in the
literature. Section 7 concludes.
2 The economic environment
Below, we augment the decentralized, general equilibrium model proposed in Leach (2004)
by adding sectors of the economy where existing technology stocks are enhanced by com-
petitive ﬁrms through investment. We model the interaction of ﬁnite-lived agents and
competitive ﬁrms in markets for capital, labour, carbon fuel, and technology. Agents own
the capital stock and equal shares of a resource extraction ﬁrm. They rent capital and
4labour at competitive prices, and smooth their consumption through savings decisions.
Capital supplied through agents’ savings is used by ﬁrms for ﬁnal production as well as
for research and development activities. Final production uses carbon energy, which is
supplied at competitive prices, and technology supplied by ﬁrms which develop carbon-
reducing and alternative energy technology. Energy production technology is a market
good, where ﬁrms invest to improve technology to meet proﬁt maximization goals. The
productive capacity of the economy is negatively aﬀected by climate change induced by
the use of carbon resources. Below, we present each sector of the model completely for
clarity of notation.
2.1 Government
A government is assumed to possess only ﬁscal means of inﬂuencing emissions, through
either emissions taxes, subsidies to research and development, or subsidies for alternative
energy use. Speciﬁcally, the government may impose a well-head tax τt on carbon extrac-
tion, it may subsidize research and development by matching private investment, or it
can directly subsidize the use of alternative energy in ﬁnal production. All policies are
implemented such that the budget is balanced in each time period by a lump-sum tax
(subsidy) paid by (remitted to) agents.
2.2 Agents
A new cohort of agents is born in each period, and lives for L = 60 periods. Agents have
an age-speciﬁc labour endowment, el, ∀l ∈ 1..L, which they supply inelastically. Denote
the size of the birth cohort in each period t as N1,t, and let the eﬀective labour supply,
Nt, in each period be deﬁned as follows:












Agents are born with an initial endowment of assets, a1,t, and seek to maximize their life-
time utility through consumption and savings decisions. Denoting by cl,t the consumption
5by age l agents in model time period t, we can deﬁne the lifetime utility of an individual





where β ∈ (0,1) is a discount factor applied to the utility of future consumption. Suppose






+ ¯ u. (2.5)
Autonomous utility ¯ u is a constant which scales utility such that it is always positive, which
ensures consistency when aggregating discounted utility in measures of welfare. In each
period, agents receive income from their asset holdings al,t, from their supply of labour,
and from a dividend paid by the resource extraction ﬁrm, dt. They also receive a lump-
sum repayment (deduction) of net taxes (subsidies), ¯ τt. Denote the gross rate of return
on capital assets, comprised of rental rate ι and depreciation rate δk, by rt = (1+ιt −δk)
and the wage rate by wt. 1 The income of an age l agent at time t is thus given by:
yl,t ≡ wtel + rtal,t + dt + ¯ τt. (2.6)
Agents must allocate this income between consumption and savings, so we can deﬁne the
budget constraint in each period as:
al+1,t+1 = yl,t − cl,t. (2.7)
Each agent’s problem is thus to maximize (2.4) by choosing a sequence of asset holdings
subject to the budget constraint in (2.7) and sequences of prices w and r. The ﬁrst order
conditions for this problem yield L − 1 Euler equations with the following form:
(yl,t + rtal,t − al+1,t+1)
−σ = βrt+1 (yl+1,t+1 + rt+1al+1,t+1 − al+2,t+2)
−σ (2.8)
∀l = 1..L, given al,t = 0∀l > L,l <= 1. The solution to these equations yields the
utility-maximizing sequence of asset holdings. Asset holdings for all agents alive in any
1 Here, we view agents as owning physical capital and thus they bear the costs of depreciation
δk. Depending on the elasticity of capital supply and demand, some or all of this cost will be
reﬂected in equilibrium price ι.




al,t ∗ Nl,t. (2.9)
2.3 Final production
The ﬁnal production sector uses capital, labour, and energy services to produce a compos-
ite good using time-varying, Cobb-Douglas technology. Energy services, the implicit third
factor of production, are produced using technologies φc,t and φa,t and carbon fuel, R. Car-
bon energy, φc,tRt, and alternative energy, φa,t, are perfect substitutes in the production
of energy services. The proﬁt function for the representative ﬁrm is given by:
Πt = Yt − wtNt − ιtKt − ζc,tφc,t − (ζa,t − Se,t)φa,t − ζr,tRt, (2.10)
where production technology is deﬁned as:




t (φc,tRt + φa,t)
θt , (2.11)
and the ﬁrm purchases inputs at competitive prices on factor markets. The rights to use
technologies φc,t and φa,t are purchased from research and development ﬁrms at prices
ζc,t and ζa,t and carbon fuel Rt is purchased at price ζr,t. Labour and capital are paid
rental rates w and ι respectively. Policy variable Se,t is a subsidy received for the use of
alternative energy technology in ﬁnal production.
The energy and labour shares of production vary with the law of motion for θ, given that
we impose constant returns to scale in all time periods. The law of motion for θ is deﬁned
as:







Total factor productivity is an endogenous outcome of economic activity driven by emissions-
induced changes in global temperature, G:
Ωt =
Ωt
(1 + b1 ∗ Gt + b2 ∗ G2
t)
, (2.13)
and is taken as given by the ﬁrm. The exogenous component of total factor productivity,
7Ω, follows the law of motion:







Factor demands from the ﬁnal production sector for capital, labour, carbon fuel, and
technology are characterized by the solutions to the ﬁve ﬁrst order conditions of the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt maximization problem:
FK = ιt (2.15)
FN = wt (2.16)
Fφa = (ζa,t − Se,t) (2.17)
Fφc = ζc,t (2.18)
FR = ζr,t (2.19)
2.4 Carbon Resource Extraction
The structure of the supply of carbon fuel, R, is taken from Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
Resources are supplied such that the marginal cost of extraction is equal to the price,
and the cost of extraction is increasing and concave in cumulative extraction, X, which
evolves as follows:
Xt+1 = Xt + Rt. (2.20)
While the supply of R is inﬁnite, extraction costs tend to inﬁnity in the long-run. Quan-
tity supplied is given by the solution, given parameters ξ and price ζr,t, to the following
equation in unknown quantity Rt:





The resource extraction ﬁrm faces increasing extraction cost per unit, and as such earns a
surplus in each period, which is assumed to be returned to agents as a per-capita dividend,
dt. 2
2 The resource ﬁrm does not dynamically choose extraction to maximize rents. It merely extracts
resources until the oﬀered price equals its marginal extraction cost in each period.
82.5 Research and Development
Our model speciﬁes two forms of knowledge which are substitutes in energy production.
Firms in the research and development sector appropriate existing knowledge for one
period and augment knowledge through investment. They then sell use of knowledge to
ﬁnal production ﬁrms. Two important market imperfections arise from this structure.
First, the ﬁrms do not internalize the future beneﬁt of accumulated knowledge, only
the current period beneﬁts. Second, through competition for capital, ﬁrms will impose
pecuniary externalities on the competing sector.
The timing in the model of knowledge accumulation is as follows. At the end of a period,
denote the stocks of technology for the production of energy by φc,t−1 and φa,t−1. Between
time periods, some of the existing technology becomes obsolete, which we denote by
depreciation factor δj for sector j = a,c. 3 Denote the un-depreciated technology carried
over from the previous period by:
Hj,t = (1 − δj) ∗ φj,t−1∀j = a,c. (2.22)
This stock serves as an input to production of new technology, and is complemented by
investment Ij,t. Technology production in both sectors is given by:




j,t + Hj,t∀j = a,c. (2.23)
In order to enhance energy production technology in any period, ﬁrms must purchase
investment capital at competitive price ιt. The ﬁrm may beneﬁt from a matching subsidy
Sj,t which deﬁnes the government contribution rate per dollar of private investment. In-










The factor demands for investment capital, and thus the supply of technology, are deter-
mined such that the ﬁrst order, necessary conditions for proﬁt maximization are satisﬁed
3 The literature is inconsistent in treatment of depreciation of knowledge. While we agree that
one does not lose knowledge, it seems reasonable to suggest that some of our knowledge is no
longer relevant to current production techniques. While our calibration reveals that depreciation
rates of zero best ﬁt the data, we retain the generality of the model here.
9in each sector. The price of energy has a positive eﬀect on the demand for capital, thus
there will be growth and displacement eﬀects of climate policy which propagate through
the capital market. Price eﬀects in the capital and energy markets will be analyzed in
detail in the results below.
This parsimonious characterization of research and development allows us to maintain the
transparency of the model and confront the model with global data to calibrate parame-
ters. The energy technology stocks should respectively equate to the carbon energy-output
ratio (φc) and the total production of alternative energy (φa). Thus, for equation (2.23),
elements on both the right and left hand sides are observable in global, aggregate data.
2.6 Climate and Emissions
The climate and emissions sectors are comparable to those presented in Nordhaus and
Boyer (2000), with the important diﬀerence being that the ratio of emissions to output and
the ratio of emissions to energy supply are endogenously determined along the transition
path.
Emissions are generated by the use of carbon fuel for energy production. We assume that
there are no technologies available for the sequestration of carbon resources used by the
energy sector, so emissions in any period are equal to the quantity of carbon extracted.
Emissions augment a slowly decaying stock of atmospheric carbon, denoted by mt, ac-
cording to:
mt = mb + Rt−1 + δm(mt−1 − mb), (2.25)
where mb is the pre-industrial level of carbon in the atmosphere, and δm is the sink rate
for carbon above pre-industrial levels present in the atmosphere at the beginning of the
year. Atmospheric carbon aﬀects global surface temperature, G, and ocean temperature,
O, through the following two-equation system:




Ot = λ2Ot−1 + (1 − λ2)Gt−1. (2.27)
These laws of motion allow us to deﬁne the standard benchmark in the literature of the
10long-run temperature change from a doubling of atmospheric carbon as G2×CO2 =
η
1−λ1−ω.
Recall that it is the value G that has a negative eﬀect on total factor productivity through
equation (2.13). 4
3 Solution
The solution to the model is deﬁned by a sequence of prices {ι, w, ζr, ζc, ζa}∞
t=1 which
generate equilibria in each of the factor markets described above across all periods. We
solve a truncated version of this inﬁnite horizon economy as follows. Denoting by 1..T
the periods over which we solve the equilibrium of the economy, we must account for the
life-cycle savings of agents born before period 1 and agents who live beyond period T.
To accomplish this, we distribute an initial stock of capital to agents alive at period 1,
and have them live shorter lives. The initial capital distribution across these agents is
calibrated to approximately match the proﬁle of asset holdings over ages for the cohort
born in period 50. 5 For agents still alive at period T, we solve their entire sequence of
asset holdings assuming that prices remain constant at T −1 values for all future periods.
We then drop the ﬁrst 20 and last 60 periods from the solution to obtain the analysis
sample. These assumptions allow for minimal sensitivity to terminal and initial conditions
as the consumption smoothing motives of all agents should be consistent. The model is
solved by iteration on the vector of prices through a Tatonnement process until excess
demand is zero for all commodities in all periods. For a complete characterization of the
solution algorithm, see Leach (2004).
4 Calibration
We make use of a highly aggregated, global model, thus we must recognize that we may
not fully capture the eﬀects of policies. However, while the model may not generate precise
predictions of the transition path of the global economy, the transparency of the model
4 We use G rather than T for temperature to avoid confusion between time and temperature.
5 This ensures that the distribution of capital among initial holders represents as close to an
optimal choice for those agents, to minimize the model’s sensitivity to initial conditions. Agents
may be endowed with debt.
11allows us to gain a sense of the propagation mechanisms which determine these paths. In
order to ensure that our predictions are as consistent as possible, the model is calibrated
to match short-run global trends in GWP, energy production, and investment in research
and development as well as to future projections commonly adopted in the literature.
We have assembled data from four principle sources. International Energy Agency (IEA)
(2004) data characterize gross world product, total primary energy supply by energy
sector, and carbon emissions. We have assembled parallel data from OECD (2004) which
characterize the same measures for OECD and IEA member countries. Research and
development expenditure data consist of observations on the US economy, collected in
World Energy Council (2001). Finally, global population data are obtained from United
Nations (UN) (2004).
Calibration of the model proceeds as follows. First, we use OECD and US data to parame-
terize the relationship between investment and technological progress in the energy sector.
Second, we calibrate the economy taking energy-sector investment as given. Finally, we
calibrate a benchmark, subsidy policy such that investment rates, and thus endogenous
technology, in the decentralized economy match investment rates observed in the data.
The values assigned to model parameters are shown in Table A.1, while transition paths
generated through model simulations are compared to the data in Figures A.1-A.4. The
calibration ﬁts the data very well, with the exception of the use of alternative energy in
production. The IEA (2004) data characterize an important decline in the rate of alter-
native energy adoption after 2010 which our model cannot replicate without additional
assumptions. As such, we focus on the period of 1970-2010 for our calibrations of this
trend. The error resulting from this approximation is evident in Figures A.3 and A.4. We
discuss potential remedies for this inconsistency in Section 6. Below, we discuss in more
detail the data and procedures that lead to ﬁxing key parameters.
4.1 Energy Research and Development
To establish the empirical relationship between investment and technological change, we
must establish the following values:
•  1a,  2a,  3a,  1c,  2c, and  3c - the parameters of the technology production function
12for both carbon-based and alternative technologies
• δc and δa - the rate of technology obsolescence in each sector
• Hc,0 and Ha,0 - the starting values for technology stocks in each sector
In order to calibrate these parameters, we have assembled data from WEC (2001) and
OECD (2004), with omissions corrected using linear interpolation, describing GWP, re-
search and development investment, emissions intensities, and energy shares by fuel for
1960-2002. We begin with OECD data, and classify energy production which does not
make direct use of fossil fuels as alternative energy and calculate empirical emissions in-
tensity of carbon energy (φc) and alternative energy production (φa). We then use the
observed rates of investment in renewable and non-renewable energy in WEC data as
representative of OECD rates over the same time period. 6 Due to limited observations
and potential confounding factors in the data, we do not attempt to fully estimate the
empirical relationship implied in (2.23), and rather we proceed as follows. For the carbon
sector, we ﬁx the relative share of investment,  2c, and existing technology,  3c, in (2.24)
to the values used in Popp (2004a), and for the alternative energy technology, we ﬁx the
investment share,  2a. We then estimate scaling factors  1j, and obsolescence factors δj
for each sector, as well as the existing technology share for alternative energy,  3a, using
simulated least squares. 7 Identifying with a bar parameters for which values are ﬁxed, and
with a hat parameters for which values are estimated, we estimate the following equations:
φc,t = ˆ  1c(Ic,t)
¯ µ2c((1 − ˆ δc)φc,t−1)
¯ µ3c + (1 − ˆ δc)φc,t−1 (4.1)
and
φa,t = ˆ  1a(Ia,t)
¯ µ2a((1 − ˆ δa)φa,t−1)
ˆ µ3a + (1 − ˆ δa)φa,t−1. (4.2)
We report estimation results in Table 1.
6 The WEC (2001) data give aggregate energy research and development investment from public
and private sources. We assume that the average shares of 12% of public funding and 70% of
private funding going to the fossil fuel sector remain constant through the sample period.
7 For the estimation, we use data for the 1960-2002 time period, hence N=42.
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Simulated Least Squares results for research and development sector calibration.
Carbon Energy Alternative Energy
 1,j 0.0057055 0.085543
 2,j 0.22* .22*
 3,j 0.55* 0.49998
δj 0 0
N 42 42
(*) indicates a ﬁxed parameter
4.2 The Climate Model and the Carbon Cycle
The climate model maintains the same parameter values as Leach (2004). 8 The set of
parameters implies a half-life of atmospheric carbon of 44 years, which is slightly on the
high side of statements by the IPCC (2001) that 40-60% of emissions are removed from
the atmosphere within 30 years. 9 We calibrate temperature change to a long-run 3oC
warming for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 . The supply of carbon fuel is deﬁned by the
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) parameters.
4.3 Other Economic Sectors
The number of parameters in the economic model far exceeds the identiﬁcation capacity
of our global data, so we must ﬁx certain parameters and then choose the values of others
to replicate desired trends. As such, we proceed iteratively as follows.
Parameters for population growth are chosen to match data from United Nations (2004).
Agents are assumed to live from 16-76 years old, and the productivity proﬁle which deﬁnes
el for each age l is calibrated to the average deviations of earnings from mean earnings by
age in the Labour Force Survey (Statistics Canada, 2004). The parameters governing the
agents’ asset accumulation problems are those for which we have the least data to guide
our calibration. We ﬁx the depreciation rate of capital to 5% per year, the agents’ discount
8 Readers familiar with the Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) models will note signiﬁcant diﬀerences
as a result of using an annual time interval rather than the 10 year interval used in Nordhaus
and Boyer. For a comparable model using an annual time interval, see Pizer (1999).
9 Our parameter value implies that 62% of emissions would be removed within 30 years.
14factor to β=.96, and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to σ = 1.2213, which are the
values used in Pizer (1999). 10 We also adopt the Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) value for
the capital share parameter α, equal to .3.
We also need, at this point, a ﬁrst estimate of the benchmark subsidy values for alternative
and fossil fuel investment. In WEC (2001), we ﬁnd that ratios of public to private ﬁnancing
are approximately 3.08:1 in the alternative sector and .19:1 in the fossil fuel sector. We
use these rates below, and calibrate the aggregate trends in the model such that the total
primary energy supply matches the global aggregate trends. We will then adjust these
rates to match the combination of fossil fuel and alternative energy in the data.
We calibrate the trends for the energy share and total factor productivity and the initial
capital endowment using simulations of the model. Agents’ initial capital endowment is
deﬁned such that the capital stock in 1970, the ﬁrst period in the analysis sample, is equal
to the value used in Nordhaus (1994), converted to $1997 US. The energy share parameter
θ is time varying. We ﬁx the initial value to be .37, and set parameters γθ = −.0185 such
that the energy share of ﬁnal production matches observed data. Finally, we also adjust
parameters determining the exogenous evolution of total factor productivity to ensure
that economic growth and energy supply follow IEA (2004) medium-term projections.
4.4 Benchmark Policy
The calibration exercise to this point has focussed only on the total primary energy supply.
We now adjust the subsidy rates used in the calibration such that the mix of alternative
and fossil fuel energy supply matches the data. Carbon taxes and alternative energy
subsidies are set to zero in these simulations. We ﬁnd that when the rate of government
subsidy is 1.45:1 (.25:1) in the alternative (carbon) sector, the fuel mix in the simulations
matches the data over the 1970-2010 period. The alternative fuel share is lower than that
10 In Pizer (1999), the CRRA coeﬃcient is a parameter in a social welfare function which is
maximized by a social planner under uncertainty over parameter values in the climate model.
The literature is by no means consistent on an approximate value for this parameter. Previous
IAM studies have tended to use logarithmic utility, limσ→1, while values in the macroeconomics
literature vary substantially. For a complete discussion of the role of the CRRA, see Kocherlakota
(1996). Compared to a logarithmic utility model, our parameterization will imply smoother
utility paths for agents.
15observed in the data. It is likely that our characterization of all funding being paid out
as a complement and not a substitute to private investment leads to lower government
funding rates by increasing the marginal return to private investment.
4.5 Future projections
Given the time scale over which climate change policies must be evaluated, the parameter
values determining the future evolution of the economy will hold great leverage on the
results. Speciﬁcally, the long-run growth rates of the energy share parameter θ and the
value of exogenous factor productivity, Ω, will have the largest eﬀects. For comparability,
we adopt assumptions on these values which are consistent with Nordhaus and Boyer
(2000).
The energy share of production is assumed to decline exogenously in Equation (2.12). An
initial rate of decline of 1.8% per year in this parameter allows us match energy share data
over the calibration period. We assume that the second derivative of the energy share with
respect to time is determined by δθ = .007, which is consistent with Nordhaus and Boyer’s
assumption that this parameter lies between 6% and 10% per decade for the regions in
RICE-99.
The exogenous trend for factor productivity is set such that its second derivative with re-
spect to time is near zero over the model period. This is consistent with global assumptions
in the DICE-99 model in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000).
5 Climate Change Policy Evaluation
The policy evaluation results are intended to illuminate the propagation mechanisms
which lead to the long-run outcomes of climate policy. We examine the eﬀects of two
policy mechanisms available to governments: carbon taxes and direct funding of research
into alternative energy and carbon-reducing technologies. We further examine the impli-
cations of recycling the revenues from a carbon tax as a subsidy to alternative energy use
rather than as a lump-sum transfer to agents. Below, we discuss the measures of policy
performance and the evaluation results for each type of policy.
16In order to evaluate policies aimed at reducing society’s reliance on carbon emissions
through the stimulation of research and development, we may use both positive and
normative metrics. Natural positive metrics are GWP, total emissions, energy intensity,
emissions intensity, and global surface temperature. It is more diﬃcult to develop the
appropriate normative metric of social welfare, which is where the overlapping generations
model becomes an important tool. For an individual agent, the sum of indirect utilities
discounted at the private rate of time preference provides a positive measure of their
welfare. The aggregation of the utility measures of individual agents within and across
time periods is purely normative, and the model is structured such that the choice of
aggregation and social discounting will have no impact on the outcome of the economy,
only on how we value a particular transition path over another, ex post. 11 We abstract
from this discussion, and report only the private evaluation of welfare: for each time
period, our measure of welfare is simply the sum of discounted, indirect utility for agents
born in that period.
5.1 Carbon Taxes and Alternative Energy Subsidies
We impose a $50/ton carbon tax and examine the implication of recycling the revenues
from this tax to agents directly on a per-capita basis (denoted by Carbon Tax - LS), or
applying these revenues as a subsidy to alternative energy use in ﬁnal production (denoted
by Carbon Tax - EAS).
The carbon tax has a large, immediate impact on production regardless of the means of
recycling, shown in Figure A.5. GWP drops by almost 1% as a result of limited short-
term substitution for carbon energy. The ﬁrst 80 years after the policies are implemented
show virtually no diﬀerence in GWP across the recycling methods, however, when the
carbon tax is diverted for alternative energy subsidies, GWP recovers and eventually rises
to a level 4.85% above benchmark values, while the maximum impact is 4.15% with the
recycling to agents.
Many of the long-run growth eﬀects of policies come from induced innovation. Figures
A.6 and A.7 show the eﬀects of the tax policies in terms of induced investment. The
11 Agent responses to equilibrium prices determine consumption. Agents make decisions which
are privately optimal, and do not consider how society values their consumption path.
17carbon tax recycled to agents generates an immediate 60% increase in private investment
in alternative energy, and investment levels remain above the benchmark for roughly 200
years and then are slightly below the benchmark thereafter. The recycling of tax revenues
in the form of a subsidy to alternative energy use magniﬁes this to more than 200%.
The increases in alternative energy capacity are shown in Figure A.8. Were the private
rate of return to alternative energy investment large enough to justify investing all of the
proceeds of the carbon tax in alternative energy technology, the results of the two policies
would be equivalent. However, agents choose to consume some of the proceeds of the tax,
while allocating some to capital accumulation which drives innovation.
We see some potential evidence of displacement eﬀects as a results of the carbon tax.
Investment in carbon-reducing technology is lowered by 15% immediately with further
reductions in the near term under both policies, but recovers in later stages, again as
carbon resources become relatively less expensive. This is however the combined result of
two eﬀects. The primary eﬀect is that, with an increase in resource prices, the value of
carbon-reducing technology decreases. The second is a medium-term crowding out eﬀect,
where the increase in alternative energy capacity further reduces the rate of return to
carbon-reducing technology investment. We attempt to isolate these eﬀects in the next
section and in the sensitivity analysis.
As a result of induced innovation and factor substitution, the carbon tax reduces en-
ergy use dramatically in the short term, however long-term energy use is greater than
the benchmark case, as shown in Figure A.9. The reduction in emissions relative to the
benchmark is also not permanent, as shown in Figure A.10. As the benchmark carbon
price eventually rises to levels higher than those under the carbon tax, carbon resources
become cheaper under the tax than at the same period of time under the benchmark,
again as a result of reduced cumulative extraction. As such, while emissions decrease
rapidly by almost 40% after the imposition of the tax, they eventually rebound to be
above benchmark levels. 12
12 Speciﬁcally, we observe higher emissions under the carbon tax (LS) policy after 2205, and
after 2210 for the carbon tax (EAS) policy. Cumulative emissions are everywhere lower under
the tax regardless of recycling. After 100 years, cumulative extraction levels are 1305, 794, and
745 GtC respectively under the benchmark, the carbon tax, and the carbon tax with alternative
energy subsidy.
18The energy intensity and carbon intensity of production follow paths similar to emissions
and energy levels as shown in Figures A.11 and A.12; initially decreasing, but surpass-
ing the benchmark case marginally after 150 years. The carbon resource conservation is
again at the heart of this result. The eventual increase in emissions over benchmark lev-
els as well as increases in emissions and energy intensity are of particular interest since
papers published in the literature with only carbon-saving technology will not show this
characteristic. In the sensitivity analysis section below, we further examine this result.
The aggregate growth results above are due in part to climate change eﬀects, since the
carbon tax reduces cumulative emissions by almost 50% over the ﬁrst 100 years. However,
the induced temperature diﬀerence of approximately 1oC after 100 years increases total
factor productivity by only .34%. While this diﬀerence is small, the evolution of the
economy is such that, while being marginally more productive as a result of reduced
climate change damages, it also develops expanded capacity for producing alternative
energy relative to the benchmark. Combined with the fact that the relative price of carbon
resources is kept lower through reduced cumulative extraction, the economy is able to
recover to higher levels than under the benchmark scenario. Since the energy-production
capacity is higher with the alternative energy subsidy than under the lump-sum recycling,
we see some additional improvements.
Finally, in terms of welfare, an additional result sheds light on the political economy
of climate policy. Regardless of the chosen method of tax recycling, agents alive when
the policy is implemented are uniformly worse oﬀ. Where the tax revenues are recycled
to agents as a lump-sum payment, agents are partially compensated for their drop in
consumption, but they are still constrained by the drop in production and the marginal
products of labour and capital. 13 Younger agents are quickly found to be better oﬀ under
the carbon tax than they would be in the benchmark case. They can borrow against future
productivity, and since agents receive a progressive, per-capita share, not an income-based
share, they are better oﬀ under the carbon tax. The alternative energy subsidy funded
by the carbon tax has a longer payback period in terms of welfare because agents are not
compensated directly for their drop in consumption, but rather in the long-run by lower
energy costs and by climate change mitigation. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrst cohort of agents who
13 Policies are imposed with perfect foresight, so agents will increase savings before the policy
goes into eﬀect to smooth their utility streams.
19would be better oﬀ under the carbon tax policy with lump-sum recycling are born 16 years
after the policy is implemented. The ﬁrst cohort made better oﬀ by the energy subsidy
relative to the benchmark are born 40 years after the policy is imposed, but these agents
still prefer the lump-sum recycling to the energy subsidy. The ﬁrst agents who prefer the
alternative energy subsidy to the per-capita payment as the means of recycling proceeds
from the carbon tax are those born 100 years after the policies are imposed.
5.2 Research ﬁnancing
We model government subsidies to research and development imposed as complements
to private investment. The benchmark values for the rates at which governments match
private research expenditure are 1.45:1 in the alternative sector and .25:1 in the carbon
sector. We examine the eﬀect doubling the government subsidy rate in one sector, holding
the subsidy rate in the other sector constant. There may be both direct and indirect eﬀects
of these increases. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in changes in the cross-sector crowding
out of research and development arising from technology competition. This policy diﬀers
from the carbon taxes discussed above because the policy induces an increase in capital
demand which is not accompanied by an aggregate economic slowdown.
Popp (2004a, 2004b) and Nordhaus (2002) each account for the external cost of research
and development in the energy sector. 14 Speciﬁcally, Popp (2004a) contends that spend-
ing on energy research and development crowds out other investment at a rate implying
that 50% of new investment comes at the expense of investment in other research and
development. This crowding out rate has important leverage on the optimal policy results
since it determines the social cost of new innovations.
Our model diﬀers from Popp (2004a) in two ways important to this discussion. First,
agents’ savings decisions determine the supply of capital, so the price of capital will reﬂect
the private rates of return to investment. The rates of return will be equalized across all
investment avenues, and equal to the private marginal product of capital in research
14 Popp (2004a) assumes that the social cost of research and development is captured by the
constraint Kt+1 = (It−4∗crowdout∗RE,t)+(1−δK)Kt, such that each unit of new research and
development investment, RE,t, crowds out some of its value from other research and development
activities, assumed to have a social cost equivalent to 4 units of physical capital, K.
20and development and ﬁnal production. The diﬀerence between the social and private
rates of return to research and development is determined by the choice of a welfare
function, from which we largely abstract in this paper. However, in our decentralized
model, crowding out is an endogenous consequence of climate policies: an increase in the
rate of return in one research and development sector will increase the demand for capital,
thus increasing aggregate interest rates and/or reducing quantities of capital used for both
ﬁnal production and investment in competing technologies. However, since research and
development outside the energy sector is not considered in our model, we may not capture
fully the crowding out eﬀect of energy research and development on other technological
progress. For the results reported in this paper, we look only at crowding out within the
energy sector.
We can see from Figures A.6 and A.7 that the eﬀects on private investment of increasing
subsidies to a particular sector are qualitatively as we would expect, however the mag-
nitudes of these eﬀects are surprising. Own-sector eﬀects are show a maximum increase
in alternative sector investment of 24% and a maximum increase in carbon sector invest-
ment of 5.3%. The displacement eﬀects are smaller than suggested by Popp (2004a). The
maximum reduction in private investment in carbon energy induced by increasing fund-
ing to alternative energy is 14%, while in the alternative sector, carbon subsidies reduce
investment by a maximum of only 1.3%. Some diﬀerence across sectors is expected due to
the structure of carbon sector technology as being a complement to resources in energy
production, and the diﬀerence in benchmark subsidy rates.
Displacement eﬀects within the research and development sectors are more muted than
the 50% suggested by Popp (2004a). Below, we explore the characteristics of the capital
market and agent investment and ﬁnd that supply and ﬁnal production demand are both
suﬃciently locally elastic to absorb some of the increase in demand from the subsidized
sector without leading to a large decrease in investment by other research and development
sectors. This suggests that optimal policy models may have over-estimated the social-cost
of research and development, and thus under-estimated its role in determining the social
costs of climate policy.
In terms of aggregate economic eﬀects, these policies are not signiﬁcant to the same degree
as the $50/ton carbon tax. However, an interesting result from our welfare calculations
21allows us to again shed light on the political economy of climate policy. We ﬁnd that the
increased carbon subsidy would be welfare-preferred to the increase in alternative energy
sector subsidies or to the status quo by agents born through the year 2036.
6 Discussion
In this section, we attempt to identify the components of the model which may have
important leverage on the results. In particular, we examine the importance of the de-
centralized capital market, the role of technology competition, and the eﬀect of altering
the structure of the energy production function.
6.1 The role of the capital market
Above, we discuss the role of the capital market in propagating displacement eﬀects.
Here, we attempt to isolate this eﬀect directly. In models proposed by Popp (2004a) and
Nordhaus (2002), investment and environmental policy are co-determined. In this context,
crowding out costs are assumed to constrain the net beneﬁts of emissions control policy.
While these policies increase our environmental capital, they come at a productivity cost,
and may also attract investment away from sectors with high social rates of return. An
over-estimate of this last eﬀect will lead a planner to choose lower levels of emissions
control at the margin, or to choose policies which induce less innovation where that is an
option.
In our general equilibrium model, crowding out is an endogenous consequence of increasing
capital demand leading to increased interest rates. Carbon tax policies imposed in an
unrestricted model will induce simultaneous decreases in the supply of capital by agents
and in the demand for capital in ﬁnal production and increases in demand for research
capital.
How much variation is actually induced in the supply of capital and the interest rate? In
Figure A.13, it is clear that the savings decisions of agents are elastic to the interest rate
changes induced by the policies. For the carbon tax with lump-sum recycling, there is
some dis-saving before the policies go into eﬀect, since young agents are anticipating their
22tax revenues in coming years. With the alternative energy subsidy, the reverse occurs,
as agents accumulate capital to insulate themselves from the economic slowdown. In the
long-term, the more productive economy leads to increased capital accumulation. 15 For
the alternative technology subsidy alone, we see the eﬀect of increased capital demand
leading to increased capital formation in the long-term.
Crowding out will occur where the supply of capital is not suﬃciently price-elastic to sat-
isfy new demand induced by policy changes without signiﬁcant increases in interest rates.
Given the decentralized structure of our model, we can isolate these capital market eﬀects
by taking the benchmark capital supply as given, re-solving the model, and comparing the
transition paths. Recalculating the results from the alternative energy technology subsidy,
we ﬁnd that the impacts of assuming a ﬁxed capital stock are small and mostly felt in the
long term. As reduced emissions render the economy more productive, the production sec-
tor begins demanding more capital than in the benchmark and begins to crowd out other
investment. In the short term, the demand for capital in ﬁnal production is suﬃciently lo-
cally price elastic so that displaced investment in technology is only increased marginally
by the inelastic capital market, and most of the capital for induced innovation is obtained
at the expense of physical capital. We replicate these calculations for the Nordhaus (2002)
assumption that capital is available in inﬁnite quantity at benchmark interest rates. We
ﬁnd that this leads to small increases in capital accumulation and investment.
We cannot refute the contention that some capital for induced investment in energy tech-
nology crowds out other investment rather than generating new investment. In fact, earlier
results of the crowding out rate increase only slightly when we impose a ﬁxed capital mar-
ket. However, we ﬁnd that much of the new investment in research and development comes
at the expense of physical capital used in ﬁnal production, not other research and devel-
opment. As such, if our model correctly captures the elasticity of savings decisions, an
assumption that 50% of induced investment is likely to be acquired from other research
and development opportunities with a high social rate of return may be an overestimate.
15 Here, we cannot use the values to directly compute elasticities since we only observe the change
in equilibrium capital supply for a change in the equilibrium price, and the policies aﬀect both
the supply and demand for capital.
236.2 The role of technology competition
In Popp (2004a) and Nordhaus (2002), investment is only possible in carbon-reducing
technology, and not directly in carbon-free technology, while other papers such as Gerlagh
(2003) emphasize the role of competing technologies.
Our model allows investment in both alternative and carbon energy technologies, modeled
as substitutes in ﬁnal production. Where only a single technology is present, the eﬀect
of any price policy (a carbon tax or a carbon reduction subsidy) will be to increase
investment in carbon-reducing technology. Where two technologies exist, the impact of
the price policy on the carbon-reducing technology is not known ex ante, but rather
depends on the marginal knowledge product of investment in each of the sectors as well
as the respective marginal energy products of knowledge. In our calibrated model, these
values are such that a carbon tax will lead to a reduction in investment in the carbon-
reducing technology. Below, we examine a subset of results under the assumption that
investment in alternative energy technology is autonomous, set at levels observed in the
benchmark simulation of the model. This proxies for a single sector model, and allows us
to test the sensitivity of results to technology competition.
Here, we focus on the change in the eﬀects of the carbon tax with lump-sum revenue
recycling. Figure A.14 shows the change in carbon-reducing technology investment which
occurs as a result of ﬁxing the transition path for alternative energy technology. The
results show that, as expected, the amount of carbon-reducing investment increases where
alternative energy capacity is taken as given. However, despite the increased investment
in carbon-reducing technology, the model predicts less emissions reduction, and welfare
reductions due to the imposition of the constraint on alternative energy investment.
This implies that an optimal policy model solved with induced innovation only for carbon-
reducing technology is likely underestimate the optimal emissions reduction relative to
a case where the transitions of both carbon-free and carbon-reducing technologies are
aﬀected by policy decisions. These results echo the comparisons presented in Popp (2004b),
which show the eﬀect of a backstop technology introduced in the model proposed in Popp
(2004a). However, as acknowledged in Popp (2004b), these results may confound the
welfare eﬀects of introducing a backstop technology with those of technology competition.
Here, we begin with a two-sector model, and show the eﬀects of competition versus a
24model where innovation is constrained to benchmark values in one sector. We can thus
separate the welfare eﬀect of placing the constraint on alternative sector investment and
ﬁnd that it reduces welfare by .1-.2%.
6.3 The role of the energy aggregation function
The model used in the simulations to this point uses a parsimonious ﬁnal production struc-
ture where alternative and carbon energy services are aggregated linearly. This structure
is such that the model cannot be well calibrated to ﬁt IEA (2004) data which show a
decline in the rate of alternative technology adoption in medium-term projections. Here,
we re-examine the results under diﬀering assumptions for the elasticity of energy services
with respect to changes in alternative energy technology. This analysis allows us to capture
the elasticities of substitution discussed in Gerlagh and Lise (2005), while maintaining our
parsimonious structure. 16 Speciﬁcally, we recast the ﬁnal production function as:




t (φc,tRt + (φa,t)
ρ)
θt , (6.1)
such that ρ determines the marginal energy services provided to ﬁnal production by ad-
ditional alternative energy capacity. Figure A.15 shows this relationship for alternative
values of ρ = .5, ρ = .8, and for ρ = 1, the linear aggregation case used throughout
the paper. We re-calculate the policy simulation results for the carbon tax with revenue
recycled as an alternative energy subsidy for each of these cases.
The following expected eﬀects occur by construction. Since a decrease (increase) in ρ
reduces (increases) the marginal energy product of new alternative sector investment
holding technology in the carbon-reducing sector constant, we expect to see a less (more)
asymmetric response in investment as ρ decreases (increases), with additional carbon-
reducing investment complementing alternative sector investment. In the benchmark case,
we see substantial increases in investment in alternative energy technology, combined with
a decrease in investment in carbon technology. This induced innovation in alternative
capacity for the case of perfect substitutes (ρ = 1) exceeds that for ρ = .8 (ρ = .5) by
increasing factors of 5-10% (10-15%).
16 We do not re-calibrate any other parameters in the model in order to perform these simulations.
25The economy’s ability to compensate for carbon taxes with increased alternative energy
use is reduced by the decreasing elasticity. As a result, we see dramatic increases in the use
of carbon-reducing technology to oﬀset the eﬀects of the carbon tax. As shown in Figure
A.16, the reliance on carbon energy is greatly increased under reductions of parameter ρ.
This is very important for interpreting our results, since the value of this parameter for
future sources of alternative energy is largely unknown.
7 Conclusion
We develop a model in which induced innovation occurs in a decentralized environment
which is consistent with the following stylized facts. First, the beneﬁts and costs of climate
policy are distributed unequally across cohorts of ﬁnite-lived agents. Second, the supply
of capital is not jointly determined with emissions policy, but rather by the self-interested
decisions of economic agents. Third, research and development activities are undertaken
by proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms, and ﬁrms in the economy must compete to acquire capital
as they do other factors of production. Finally, the government employs ﬁscal means to
inﬂuence the decisions of agents and ﬁrms in an imperfect market.
We show that the capital market provides an important propagation mechanism for in-
duced innovation. Speciﬁcally, we show that many policies may simultaneously reduce the
demand for capital and reduce its supply such that interest rate eﬀects will be limited.
This will not be the case uniformly across all policy choices. We also show that, given our
calibration, the demand for ﬁnal production capital is more locally price elastic than the
demand for research and development capital. As such, much of the investment displaced
by induced innovation may be physical and not knowledge capital, implying a lower social
cost of induced innovation than previously speciﬁed in the literature.
We show that the inclusion of sectors oﬀering carbon-reducing and carbon-free technolo-
gies inﬂuences policy analysis results. Where carbon-reducing technologies are the only
option available, induced innovation reduces emissions and energy intensity in the long-
run, while the same may not be true under technology competition. Where there are also
opportunities to develop carbon-free technology, global resource use will be deferred to
future periods. This eﬀect is very important for consideration of long-term climate change
26mitigation, since it may imply that policies may achieve only a delay in the onset of eﬀects
rather than a solution to the problem.
We also describe welfare eﬀects and address political economy considerations of induced
innovation. We show that while agents prefer lump-sum recycling of carbon taxes or
carbon reducing subsidies in the short-term, aggregate economic performance and long-
term emissions reduction are maximized through recycling of tax revenues to alternative
energy subsidies or through direct subsidies to backstop technology development.
The results of this paper in terms of the absolute eﬀects of climate policy must be taken
with caution. Research and development proceeds generally follow a stochastic process,
and are not directly and predictably correlated with investment as they are in this paper.
However, if we are able to capture the expected returns to investment in sector-speciﬁc
research, we are able to better evaluate the impacts of climate policies than we would be
able to in a model of exogenous technological change. The introduction of a stochastic
innovation process in the presence of risk-averse agents, an analog to the model we propose,
would likely be intractable. As such, it is important to interpret the results presented with
the caveat that, in the best case scenario, we are limited to describing the welfare of agents
and the evolution of the economy under the expected consequences of climate policies.
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28Table A.1
Calibrated and Fixed Parameter Values
Parameter Description Value
Fixed Parameters, Research and Development Sector
 1a Scaling factor, alt. energy research 0.085543
 2a Existing technology share, alt. energy research 0.49998
 3a Investment Share, alt. energy research .2
δa Knowledge obsolescence, alt. energy 0
 1c Scaling factor, carbon energy research 0.0057055
 2c Existing technology share, carbon energy research .55
 3c Investment Share, carbon energy research .2
δc Knowledge obsolescence, carbon energy 0
Fixed Parameters, Economic Sector
σ Coeﬃcient of Relative Risk Aversion 1.2213
β Discount Rate .96
δk Capital Depreciation Rate .05
α Production Share of Capital .3
ξ1 Minimum extraction cost of carbon($) 113
ξ2 Linear rate in extraction cost of carbon 700
ξ3 Exponent in extraction cost of carbon 4
Calibrated Parameters, Economic Sector
γθ Growth of energy share of production -0.0185
δθ Decay rate of energy share of production 0.007
γω Growth rate of technical change 0.0117
δω Decay rate on γω 5.2617 × 10−11
γn Growth rate of population 0.02
δn Decay rate on γn .03
Fixed Parameters, Climate Sector
mb Preindustrial concentration of CO2 590
δa atmospheric retention of CO2 .9846
δe atmospheric retention of emissions .987
λ1 AR(1) parameter on temperature deviations .9472
λ2 Temperature sensitivity to CO2 doubling .341633
λ3 Rate of mixing for ocean and surface temperature 0.009866
G2×CO2 Implied temperature sensitivity to CO2 doubling 3
λ4 AR(1) parameter on ocean temperature deviations 0.02
b1 Linear component in damages from temperature changes -0.0045
b2 Quadratic component in damages from temperature changes 0.0035
29Table A.2
Initial Period (1970) Values
Variable Description Calibrated Value
K0 Capital Stock, US$ 20.206 ∗ 1012
N0 Eﬀective Labour Supply 3669.8 ∗ 106
ω0 Productivity .019635
θ0 Initial Energy Share of Production .037
m0 Atmospheric CO2 levels, GtC 675
G0 Surface temperature change, oC 0.05
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